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Introduction
IMAGINE YOU ARE SURFING THE INTERNET, perhaps looking
for a last minute gift idea for a loved one. You have searched a num-
ber of e-groups1 for ideas and stumble across a site called
“Candyman.” Thinking it may shed some light on your search, you
enter the group and are soon shocked by the forum’s dialogue.
Rather than finding a medium with which to share innocent thoughts
and content, you discover a forum aimed at posting, sharing, and
transmitting illegal hard-core child pornography. Amidst this confu-
sion, you also learn that the host site, Yahoo!, owns and profits from
this e-group but is nevertheless immune from any liability whatsoever.
Does this state of affairs concern you? Should it?
Unfortunately, given the current state of the law, such accounts
are not reserved to conjecture or illusion. The aforementioned scena-
rio mirrors the facts of Doe v. Bates,2 a case indicative of how courts
currently approach Internet Service Provider3 (“ISP”) liability for
* J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law and M.D.R., Straus Institute for Dispute
Resolution, 2011; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2006. Special thanks to Dr. Babette
Boliek, Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, for her insight
and guidance in preparing this article.
1. E-groups may be defined as “topic-specific forums which allow, encourage, and
facilitate e-group members to engage in discussions, share photographs and files, plan
events, exchange ideas and information, and nurture interests and activities.” Katy Noeth,
The Never-Ending Limits of § 230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual Exploitation of Children,
61 FED. COMM. L.J. 765, 770 n.35 (2009) (citation omitted).
2. No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
3. An Internet Service Provider or “ISP” has been considered by courts to be an
interactive computer service. Noeth, supra note 1, at 766 n.5. Section 230(f)(2) of the
Communications Decency Act provides:
109
110 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
hosting content dealing with the sexual exploitation of children.4 The
outcome is an environment in which ISPs may host content that ex-
ploits children, including illegal hard-core child pornography, with
virtually no liability. The current direction of the law in this context is
unsatisfactory and requires reform. This article outlines the deficien-
cies in the current system and offers a fresh perspective aimed at ulti-
mately making the Internet safer for the next generation.
Section I provides a background of § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”), which governs immunity for providers and
users of “interactive computer service[s]” that publish third-party con-
tent.5 Section II summarizes some landmark decisions in § 230 juris-
prudence and their shortcomings. In investigating a broad scope of
alternatives, Section III outlines options for imposing liability for ISPs.
Section IV introduces a policy argument advocating a voluntary vicari-
ous liability program for ISPs while Section V addresses potential criti-
cisms to this new program. Finally, to envision how this policy
argument would translate to real-world application, Section VI applies
the proposal to the facts of Bates.
I. Background of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
A. Introduction to § 230
Section 230 of the CDA, enacted in 1996, provides immunity to
ISPs by barring claims based on publication of third-party content.6
An ISP is immune from state law claims if there is: “(1) [a] ‘provider
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2000). Case law suggests an ISP is defined as a website that “func-
tions as an intermediary by providing a forum for the exchange of information between
third party users.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
4. See Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *3; Noeth, supra note 1, at 770 (noting the judicial
trend of broadening § 230 immunity). It is clear that the problem of child pornography
still requires reform: “Some experts estimate that there are approximately 14 million por-
nographic websites with some posting approximately one million child abuse images.” Be-
yond Borders, Inc., What ISPs Could and Should Do to Prevent Child Sexual Exploitation, http://
www.beyondborders.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/fact-sheet-ispsfinal2.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
5. See § 230. As discussed, an ISP is considered an “interactive computer service” and,
therefore, falls within the scope of the CDA. See generally supra note 3.
6. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”).
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or user of an interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is based on
‘information provided by another information content provider’; and
(3) the claim would treat [the ISP or other Defendant] ‘as publisher
or speaker’ of that information.”7
The scope of this provision extends to any “interactive computer
service.” Courts have interpreted this term broadly as including blogs,
listservs, and forums as long as the information is provided to a third
party.8 Ultimately, § 230 may bar not only defamation-based claims
but also claims relating to speech-based torts, misappropriation, inva-
sion of privacy, and, most recently, claims of negligence against ISPs
for failing to protect children from sexual predators.9 In the context
of ISPs, § 230 has generally provided immunity from both distributor
and publisher liability.10
B. Narrow Exception to § 230
Despite the CDA’s broad scope, Congress provided an exception
to § 230. Subsection 230(e) states, in relevant part, that “[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section
223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relat-
ing to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal
criminal statute.”11 As shall be discussed, courts have been unwilling
to utilize this narrow exception. As a corollary, this exception is virtu-
ally useless in restricting broad liability for ISPs that are presently free
to knowingly profit from hosting illegal child pornography.
7. Universal Comm. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). In addition, § 230(c) provides protection for “Good Samaritan” block-
ing and screening of offensive material. This provides protection for “any action volunta-
rily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or other-
wise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”
§ 230(c)(2)(A). However, as shall be discussed, this standard is not a requirement for ISPs
and is not clearly defined in relevant case law. See generally infra Part II.
8. Citizen Media Law Project, Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications
Decency Act, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishers-under-
communications-decency-act (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). Generally, a listserv, or list server,
is a program that automatically sends messages to multiple email addresses on a mailing
list.
9. See id.
10. See Noeth, supra note 1, at 766.
11. § 230(e)(1). This section provides certain exceptions from civil liability including:
(1) federal criminal law, (2) intellectual property law, (3) state law that is consistent with
this section, and (4) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. See generally
§ 230(e)(1)–(4).
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C. Congressional Intent in Enacting § 230
Prior to enactment of the CDA, there was much confusion over
distributor liability as it pertained to the Internet.12 Most notably,
Congress was prompted by two New York state court decisions that
reached markedly different conclusions.13
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,14 the court established a precedent
for applying defamation law to the Internet medium. Plaintiffs
brought an action for libel, unfair competition, and business dispar-
agement based on allegedly defamatory statements made in a publica-
tion carried on the defendant’s electronic bulletin board.15
Specifically, Cubby sued CompuServe, an ISP, over information
contained in a CompuServe forum.16 The forum was provided by an
independent contractor without CompuServe’s editorial participa-
tion.17 In granting CompuServe’s motion for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
opined that CompuServe could not be liable because it did not know,
nor did it have reason to know, about the alleged defamatory state-
ments.18 The court dismissed the case by finding that CompuServe
should not be treated as a distributor even if it did not review content
before it was hosted on its website.19
Only four years later, a similar issue was brought before a New
York state court in Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.20 In that
case, Prodigy advertised itself as a “family oriented” computer network
that used content guidelines and a software-screening program for its
online bulletins.21 The court found that, because of these measures,
Prodigy was acting more like a “publisher” than a “distributor” and
was thus fully liable for all the content hosted on its site.22
Cubby and Stratton illustrated an inconsistent and seemingly arbi-
trary court rationale. This resulted in a:
12. See generally Noeth, supra note 1.
13. See Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defa-
mation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658–61 (2002).
14. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
15. Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 137–38.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 142.
19. 776 F. Supp. at 144.
20. 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
21. Id. at 1795.
22. Id. at 1798. In other words, the court opined that Prodigy was a publisher because
it held editorial control over the Board Leader. Id.
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perverse upshot [where] . . . any effort by an online information
provider to restrict or edit user-submitted content on its site faced
a much higher risk of liability if it failed to eliminate all defamatory
material than if it simply didn’t try to control or edit the content of
third parties at all.23
In response, Congress passed the CDA, which stated that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another in-
formation content provider.”24 While this was certainly a step forward
in clarifying such jurisprudence, the Act contained “deceptively sim-
ple” language.25 Ultimately, this language would cause more problems
than it solved.
In passing this provision, Congress was most concerned with en-
suring that the threat of litigation would not hinder the development
of the Internet.26 To guarantee this result, Congress attempted to pro-
tect online intermediaries from liability for unlawful third-party con-
23. Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 8.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). See generally Matthew Schruers, The History and Eco-
nomics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 213 (2002) (“Section 230
was originally intended to compete with the CDA. It was introduced as the Online Family
Empowerment Amendment or the Cox/Wyden Amendment, and its dual purpose was to
overrule Stratton Oakmont and to encourage private efforts to cope with Internet inde-
cency.” (footnote omitted)). It is also important to note that the CDA’s enactment, at least
in its original form, was short lived. A mere week after the statute was enacted, a Federal
District court enjoined the operative provisions of the CDA. See id.; ACLU v. Reno, 24
Media L. Rep. 1379, 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting temporary restraining order against
enforcement of CDA); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883–84 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (prelimi-
narily enjoining CDA provisions), aff’d, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (United States
Supreme Court upholding district court’s opinion).
25. Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 8.
26. See § 230(b)(1), (2), (4). Congress also found that:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the
availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. (2) These
services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they re-
ceive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops. (3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural devel-
opment, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. (4) The Internet and other
interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans,
with a minimum of government regulation. (5) Increasingly Americans are rely-
ing on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and en-
tertainment services.
§ 230(a); see generally Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51
(1996).
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tent.27 Also paramount to Congress’s rationale in passing § 230 was
that creating such immunity would subsequently remove disincentives
for self-regulation of ISPs.28 This rationale will be particularly relevant
to revisit in discussing the tenets of a voluntary vicarious liability pro-
gram for ISPs.
II. Section 230 Jurisprudence and its Shortcomings
A. The So-Called Seminal Case: Zeran v. AOL
In the scope of § 230 jurisprudence, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.29
emerged as the ostensible seminal case; in reality, its rationale has
been misapplied to cases that are factually distinguishable.30 At issue
in the case was a message anonymously posted on America Online’s
(“AOL”) bulletin that advertised items glorifying the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing.31 The contact information of Plaintiff Zeran was
posted, though he had neither knowledge of nor involvement with the
postings.32 Zeran brought suit against AOL after they failed to remove
the message, alleging AOL had a “duty to remove the defamatory post-
ing promptly, to notify its subscribers of the message’s false nature,
and to effectively screen future defamatory material.”33 In a landmark
decision, the Fourth Circuit extended § 230 immunity to AOL, even
though it had prior notice of the content’s illegal nature.34 In other
words, given the set of facts, the court found that holding AOL liable
27. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27 2006) (“The Court finds that immunity from all private civil liability comports with the
clear Congressional policies to avoid disincentives to innovation and to encourage self-
regulation.”).
28. See § 230(b)(4) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . (4) to remove disincen-
tives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that em-
power parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material.”).
29. 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
30. See id.; Roxanne E. Christ & Jeanne S. Berges, Social Networking Sites: To Monitor or
Not to Monitor Users and Their Content?, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 14 (2007). Though
there has been some scholarly dialogue stating that Zeran was decided correctly, especially
given the rise of Web 2.0, such commentary does little to address the unique aspect of
child pornography. As such, these views mistakenly assert Zeran should be applicable in all
cases involving § 230 immunity. See Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Ser-
vice Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 583 (2008).
31. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 330.
34. Id. at 335.
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for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions was
barred by § 230.35
In retrospect, the Fourth Circuit’s rationale in Zeran was sound.
The court examined the particular facts of the case and found that
the ISP should not be held accountable for content hosted on its web-
site. However, this rationale has created a proverbial “slippery slope”
where courts have inappropriately cited Zeran as precedent in ex-
tending § 230 immunity to facts that are entirely unrelated. As shall be
discussed, most disconcerting is how the facts of Zeran—a case dealing
with a bulletin advertising items glorifying the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing—have been applied to cases involving the sexual exploitation of
children. Courts have not addressed how child exploitation cases may
be different, and as a result, Zeran has remained the seminal case for
§ 230 immunity conflicts, regardless of whether such conflicts deal
with the exploitation of children.
B. A Preview of Misapplication: Aquino v. ElectriCiti, Inc.
Even while the appeal in Zeran was pending, the district court’s
decision appeared to already be impacting other courts. In Aquino v.
ElectriCiti, Inc.,36 leaders of the “Temple of Set” religious group
brought a claim against a California-based ISP called ElectriCiti over
statements made by one of its subscribers.37 Specifically, an ElectriCiti
subscriber posted false statements on an anonymous online bulletin
board alleging plaintiffs were involved in various illegal acts, including
the satanic ritual abuse of children.38
Curiously, the California court did not address any differences
between these facts and those in Zeran, even though they were mark-
edly different. Instead, when ElectriCiti moved to dismiss the com-
plaint, the court held that the case was preempted by § 230 of the
CDA.39
35. Id. at 330. These traditional editorial functions include deciding whether to pub-
lish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content. Id.
36. 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1032 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997).
37. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that ElectriCiti negligently failed to ensure that
its services were not used to assist a mentally unstable individual to continue his or her
vendetta against other persons via the Internet. They also alleged that ElectriCiti actively
assisted the third party subscriber in making the objectionable postings and that the sub-
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Unfortunately, this would serve as a preview of the misapplication
that other courts would employ when citing Zeran as authority to pre-
empt claims under § 230, regardless of whether or not the case
demonstrated drastic factual differences.
Not long after, when on appeal, Zeran’s significance in the con-
text of § 230 jurisprudence became more apparent. First, it evidenced
that courts were, at the very least, aware of the idea of notice-liability
and its potential shortcomings. Specifically, Judge Wilkinson “cited
the potential effect of adopting Zeran’s arguments, noting the ‘practi-
cal implications of notice liability in the interactive computer service
context.’ The sheer volume of notifications, he argued, would create a
prohibitive, ‘impossible burden.’”40 Further, as previous scholarly dis-
cussion in this context had noted:
The Zeran ruling changed the nature of scholarly discussion of ISP
liability. Until Zeran, the debate had focused on the publisher/
distributor distinction. This was essentially a debate over the stan-
dard of liability: whether a negligence regime was preferable to a
strict liability regime. In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit discarded a lia-
bility regime in favor of a non-liability/conditional immunity re-
gime. Following Zeran, the debate has turned on whether an
immunity regime or a liability regime is appropriate.41
After Zeran, § 230 jurisprudence was at a critical juncture and would
soon take a turn toward the nonsensical.
C. A Step in the Wrong Direction: Doe v. Bates
In Bates, an underage boy’s photographs were posted on an ille-
gal pornography e-group called “Candyman,” which was hosted and
operated by Yahoo!42 The group allowed members to exchange
messages and provided a forum for posting, sharing, and transmitting
“hard-core, illegal, child pornography.”43 Plaintiffs alleged Yahoo!
knowingly hosted illegal child pornography and was liable for failing
to prevent the content from being on its website.44
40. See Schruers, supra note 24, at 216–17 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333).
41. Id. at 217–19 (citing Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998)). In
Blumenthal, Judge Paul Friedman opined that “[i]n some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrange-
ment with the service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort
liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity
and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even at-
tempted.” 992 F. Supp. at 52.
42. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2006).
43. Id. at *5 (citing Magistrate Judge Caroline Craven’s Report and Recommenda-
tion); see also Noeth, supra note 1, at 770.
44. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *3–4.
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The Texas court, in applying § 230, had the opportunity to differ-
entiate the facts from Zeran and recognize how child exploitation
could possibly be approached differently because of its particularly
vile nature and effect on minors. In making this argument, the court
could have utilized the § 230(e) exception and made an argument
that would have held Yahoo! liable to some extent. This exception
existed at the time but still had yet to be utilized in the context of
child exploitation. Instead the court relied on Zeran and found that
§ 230 immunity extended to Yahoo!, even if the ISP knowingly prof-
ited from an illegal website.45 As a result, § 230 jurisprudence took a
dangerous step toward allowing ISPs carte blanche to host any content
they wish with virtually no liability. This ultimately provides more fo-
rums for those wishing to exchange illegal child pornography—a re-
sult that makes the Internet less safe for the next generation.
D. Aggrandizing the Problem: Doe v. MySpace
The rationale from Bates, which extended § 230 immunity for
ISPs with regard to child exploitation, was soon extended beyond e-
groups. In Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,46 a thirteen-year-old girl created a pro-
file on the networking site MySpace.47 When she was fourteen, she was
contacted via MySpace by Pete Solis, a nineteen year old.48 After re-
ceiving her contact information and arranging a meeting, Solis sexu-
ally assaulted the minor.49 The girl’s parents brought suit against
MySpace, alleging it should have taken some steps to protect minors
on the networking site.50
The district court dismissed the case and granted MySpace § 230
immunity.51 In making its decision, the court relied heavily on prece-
dent from Zeran and Bates and found that because MySpace was sued
in its capacity as a publisher, it was immune from liability.52 Thus, the
court aggrandized the problem; now § 230 immunity was applied to
networking sites as well, and it appeared ISPs assumed virtually no
liability for any content they hosted.
45. Id.
46. 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
47. Id. at 846.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 848.
51. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 850–52.
52. Id. 848.
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E. Expanding § 230 Immunity Even Further: Doe v. SexSearch
While MySpace expanded § 230 immunity to networking sites, it
restricted such immunity to situations where the ISP was being sued in
its capacity as a publisher. Shortly thereafter, however, this restriction
was admonished in Doe v. SexSearch.com.53 The controversy in SexSearch
involved a plaintiff who alleged he had mistakenly engaged in inter-
course with a minor who he met via the networking service SexSearch
.com.54 Pursuant to the rationale in MySpace, the Northern District
Court of Appeals of Ohio did not evaluate the claim as pled but in-
stead concentrated on Defendant’s capacity as publisher and con-
cluded that, since the claim rested on SexSearch’s failure to remove
the girl’s profile or prevent her assaulter from communicating with
her, the claims should be barred under § 230.55 The court found the
plaintiff was inappropriately attempting to “plead around” the
CDA.”56 As a result, the court granted immunity to an ISP, even when
it was sued in its general capacity as a host of content and not specifi-
cally in its capacity as a publisher.57 Thus, the final restriction to im-
munity echoed in MySpace was breached, resulting in a system where
ISPs are virtually never liable for the content they host.
In short, § 230 jurisprudence illustrates two significant shortcom-
ings. First, it mistakenly relies on Zeran, a case addressing the distin-
guishable facts of a bulletin advertising items glorifying the Oklahoma
City bombing, which is completely unrelated to child pornography or
the exploitation of children. Although decided correctly given its par-
ticular facts, Zeran is not applicable to child exploitation cases. This
discrepancy has not been addressed, yet courts continually use Zeran
as precedent rather than examine the facts of each individual case as
pled. Second, courts have been unwilling to use § 230(e) as a viable
exception to cases dealing with the sexual exploitation of children.
Instead, they have granted immunity to ISPs irrespective of whether
they are sued in their capacity as publishers. These shortcomings have
drastic consequences on the safety of the Internet for minors and re-
quire reform.58
53. 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
54. Id. at 722.
55. Id. at 727–28.
56. Id. at 727. The court held that, “because the plaintiff’s claims all hinged on Sex-
Search’s failure to remove the girl’s profile or failure to prevent her assaulter from commu-
nicating with her, their claims were barred under § 230.” Noeth, supra note 1, at 772.
57. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
58. Child pornography is one of the fastest growing businesses online, and the con-
tent is becoming much worse. See INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION, 2008 ANNUAL AND CHAR-
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As the system presently stands, § 230 provides that civil liability
may only be imposed on the individual posters of the content.59 Thus,
providers have no incentive to change their policies, as they are free
to knowingly profit from hosting illegal material, even if it is as dis-
turbing as hard-core child pornography. Boundaries of ISP protection
under § 230 are far from satisfactory and have recently been found to
extend beyond tort liability.60 As a result, ISPs are being protected at
the expense of children. A plethora of forums are available to trans-
mit materials that sexually exploit minors. Instead of mitigating the
avenues through which such content is available, the current system
aggrandizes the problem by failing to regulate mediums through
which such content can be exchanged, making it easier for sexual
predators to exploit the next generation.
III. Options for Imposing Liability on ISPs
Having established that the present system is unsatisfactory, the
next logical step in remedying the situation is an analysis of available
options for imposing liability on ISPs. After analyzing four popular
options, it becomes evident that a policy advocating vicarious liability
is the most efficient and realistic.
ITY REPORT 7 (2009), available at http://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/IWF%20Annual%20
Report%202008.pdf. In 2008, Internet Watch Foundation found 1,536 individual child
abuse domains. Id. Of these domains, 58% were housed in the United States. Id. As of
2011, a total of 12,966 URLs contained child sexual abuse hosted on 1,595 domains world-
wide. INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION, 2011 ANNUAL AND CHARITY REPORT 12–14 (2012),
available at http://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/annual-reports/annual%20med%20res.
pdf. Also of concern is that 74% of the child victims appeared to be 10 years old or under
while 64% of all the child sexual abuse URLs depicted sexual activity between adults and
children, including the rape and sexual torture of the children. Id.
59. See § 230(c)(1).
60. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(deny- ing § 230 immunity because the court ruled that, due to the plain language of
§ 230(e)(2), immunity did not apply to intellectual property claims); Kathleen R.
v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 781 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that plaintiff’s
claims were preempted by § 230 when a child’s parents sued the local public library after
the child repeatedly downloaded sexually explicit images using the library computer);
Stoner v. eBay Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1852, 1855 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding in
dicta that, pursuant to Zeran, ISPs would not lose immunity unless they are “aiding and
abetting” criminal activity); ‘‘Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (opining that § 230 could protect against liability for breach of contract as well as
website immunity).
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A. No Liability
The first proposal, and the one most heavily favored by ISPs for
obvious reasons, is a policy of no liability. No liability proposes that
ISPs not be held responsible for any infringing activity, despite having
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement.61 Given the
aforementioned jurisprudence, one might argue the current system
practices no liability for ISPs, despite the exception in § 230(e). Such
a proposal advocates a system where:
[n]on-regulation of the Internet could be considered a controver-
sial approach to Internet regulation. However, in light of the failed
efforts to impose any coherent control over information available
on the Internet, it is better to allow the Internet to develop and
evolve before hastily intervening. When the Internet’s growth has
slowed and the effects of Internet use are plain, only then can the
law hope to create a proper regulatory regime. For now, the gov-
ernments of the world should allow the Internet to develop, grow,
expand, and realize its full potential.62
A system based on no liability or non-regulation for ISPs would
have one positive result: it would be in line with congressional intent
by ensuring the threat of litigation would not hinder the development
of the Internet.63 After all, if it is uniformly recognized that ISPs are
not responsible for the content they host whatsoever, parties would be
precluded from bringing frivolous claims against ISPs. At the same
time, this would further promulgate an unsafe environment for chil-
dren on the Internet. The current system, at least in theory, holds ISPs
somewhat responsible for the content they host. Despite this potential
for liability, this system has nevertheless resulted in an unsafe Internet
environment where many avenues such as e-groups and networking
sites may be used to sexually exploit children. A system without liabil-
ity, even just in theory, would only serve to make matters worse and
would be a step away from regulating such avenues. A system based on
no liability for ISPs, therefore, is insufficient.
B. Strict Liability
Strict liability offers the most stringent form of liability but is rela-
tively unrealistic in practice. Such a system advocates ISPs be held re-
61. See Nassir Ayyaz, Liability of ISPS for Content Hosted by Them, SMASHITS.COM, http://
articles.smashits.com/articles/legal/110303/liability-of-isps-for-content-hosted-by-them.
html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
62. Shamoil Shipchandler, The Wild Wide Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to the Regu-
latory Question, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 458 (2000) (footnote omitted).
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2), (4) (2000).
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sponsible for all the material they host regardless of their level of
knowledge.64 Since ISPs would be accountable for the services they
provide, like all other big publishers and distributors, they would have
a responsibility to review all the material hosted by them.65
Though this would undoubtedly have a dramatic impact on re-
ducing illegal material that sexually exploits children, in practice such
a system is highly impractical.66 ISPs are quite different from distribu-
tion companies because they deal with a unique medium—an elec-
tronic environment.67 Such an environment is ever-changing, and it
would be neither possible nor economically viable for an ISP to un-
dertake such responsibility.68
In particular, because of the sheer volume of Internet content,
filtering can only be done with automated tools.69 Even if imple-
mented, such filtering techniques “yield many false positives and
sometimes are over-inclusive.”70 Secondly, the filtering process entails
high costs for staff and equipment. This may have a pernicious effect
where these costs are passed on to the Internet-users.71 Ultimately,
“[g]iven its high cost, filtering may strike at the heart of the internet.
Large scale filtering has a reductive effect on the internet industry . . .
at the expense of innovation of the internet.”72 Since it puts far too
much responsibility on ISPs, strict liability is not a viable option.
C. With-Fault Liability
A third option to consider is with-fault liability, which, though not
as stringent as strict liability, ultimately results in the same shortcom-
ings. A cornerstone tenet of with-fault liability is that the ISP had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the infringing material hosted.73 In
64. Ayyaz, supra note 61; see also Jonina S. Larusdottir, Liability of Intermediaries for Copy-
right Infringement in the Case of Hosting on the Internet, 47 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 471, 474
(2004).
65. Larusdottir, supra note 64, at 474–75.
66. See generally Schruers, supra note 24, at 249 (asserting that shortcomings of strict
liability in this context exist because such liability fosters a self-interested “Dennis calculus”
which corrupts the efficiency of a negligence regime).
67. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
68. Id.
69. Maurice Schellekens, Liability of Internet Intermediaries: A Slippery Slope?, 8 SCRIPTED
J. L., TECH. & SOC’Y, 154, 169 (2011), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/.
70. Id. at 167.
71. Id. at 168–69.
72. Id. at 169.
73. See Anjali Anchayil & Arun Mattamana, Intermediary Liability and Child Pornography:
A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 48 (2010).
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cases where there was no actual knowledge, the ISP would be pre-
sumed to have constructive knowledge and be held liable.74
Like those who support a strict liability regime, proponents of
with-fault liability would likely note that such a system would place
much more responsibility on ISPs to monitor material they host,
which in turn will make it more difficult to transmit materials that
sexually exploit children.75 Though this supposition is undoubtedly
true, this argument is countered by ISPs who feel there should be a
standard where the ISP is required to have actual knowledge of the
content hosted.76 Without such a standard, the policy is virtually iden-
tical to strict liability—as discussed, it proposes unrealistic standards
with little or no pay-off for the ISP.77 Accordingly, such an option is
not viable and should be dismissed.
D. Vicarious Liability
A final option to consider in formulating a framework under
which ISPs may be held accountable is vicarious liability. This type of
liability would be imposed on an ISP where it has the right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity from which it derives direct finan-
cial gain.78 Such liability would arguably make ISPs more accountable
for the content they host. As a corollary, ISPs will be more discerning
about the type of content hosted.79 The hope is that such a system
would limit the mediums through which illegal child pornography is
readily available.
Despite these potential positive aspects, there are two hurdles
that generally prevent vicarious liability from being imposed on
ISPs.80 First, vicarious liability requires that there be some employer-
servant relationship between subscribers and ISPs.81 Second, ISPs
must directly benefit from the content uploaded by subscribers.82
Since ISPs typically only host content and are not directly benefitted
74. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
75. See generally id. (recognizing such an argument in support of a strict liability
regime).
76. Id.
77. Since the economic makeup of with-fault liability parallels strict liability, the eco-
nomic shortcomings are also applicable. See generally Schruers, supra note 24.
78. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
79. Id.
80. Id. See generally Craig A. Grossman, Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright
Doctrines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content
and Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (2005).
81. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
82. Id.
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from their subscribers, vicarious liability does not appear to be a viable
option at first glance.
Interestingly, however, an exception to these requirements exists
in the rare circumstances when an ISP owns the particular website
where the content is hosted.83 In such scenarios, the ISP receives di-
rect financial gain from use of the website, which in turn constitutes
an employer-servant relationship. Given this exception, vicarious lia-
bility is a viable option in such circumstances and seems a workable
first step toward a program that can make the Internet safer for the
next generation.
IV. Policy Argument for Vicarious Liability
Once vicarious liability has been established as a cornerstone to a
proposal, a policy argument aimed at remedying the present deficien-
cies of § 230 should be discussed. This section will address the scope
of this proposal, the role the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) must play in this context, and the perspective through which
this proposal should be viewed.
A. Scope of the Program
In the interest of promoting a relatively conservative approach
that does not drastically disrupt current legal precedent, the scope of
the program should pertain only to situations where the ISP owns the
website where the illegal material is being shared, posted, or transmit-
ted. Moreover, the program only relates to illegal material—in this
case, child pornography—which is offered no constitutional protec-
tion.84 Finally, the program will be entirely voluntary; that is, ISPs will
opt into undertaking vicarious liability for the content they host. The
incentive for doing so is getting a “seal of approval” from the FCC,
which communicates to parents that the particular ISP is safer for
their children. With such a perception, parents will be more willing to
allow their children to use such programs. As more ISPs enroll in the
83. Id.
84. Child pornography that uses actual children is illegal and offered no constitu-
tional protection. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006). Child pornography that is “obscene” is ille-
gal regardless of whether it uses children. See 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006). While ISPs that
become aware of child pornography must report this information to the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children, there is no duty to monitor sites for such content. See
18 U.S.C. § 2258A (Supp. II Vol. 2 2008); Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communica-
tions Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 227 (2008)
(asserting the conflict between speech and victim compensation as a result of § 230 is illu-
sory in the first place).
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program, those outside the scope of the FCC “seal of approval” will
find it in their best interests to take part in this effort, if only as a
mechanism to compete with their business opponents.
The effect of this narrowly tailored program will bypass the hur-
dles associated with vicarious liability. First, the ISP is directly benefit-
ted from the content since it owns the particular website where the
illegal content is hosted. Second, this creates an employer-servant rela-
tionship where the ISP benefits from the traffic provided by subscrib-
ers—the employers.85 Thus, by advocating a narrow scope, this policy
argument illustrates a workable first step where vicarious liability is a
viable option.
B. The Role of the FCC
For this program to be a workable solution, FCC involvement is of
paramount importance. As alluded to previously, this program advo-
cates that ISPs voluntarily opt-in so as to preclude a backlash from
ISPs who may feel the FCC is cracking down on their roles as service
providers. Rather than propose drastic measures, the FCC would first
grant programs the “seal of approval” discussed earlier.
In addition to an FCC “seal of approval,” this program also re-
quires there be immunity for ISPs who undertake liability. While there
is no default duty to monitor content, should an ISP become aware of
content violations on hosted websites, it has a duty to report them.86
Failure to adhere to these principles can result in fines up to $150,000
for a first offense and up to $300,000 for a secondary offense.87 By
granting participating ISPs immunity from such provisions and al-
lowing them to self-regulate and take on vicarious liability, there will
be more of an incentive to enroll in the proposed program.
85. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
86. Notably:
Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a
remote computing service to the public through a facility or means of interstate
or foreign commerce, obtains actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances de-
scribed in paragraph (2) shall, as soon as reasonably possible—(A) provide to the
CyberTipline of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, or any
successor to the CyberTipline operated by such center, the mailing address, tele-
phone number, facsimile number, electronic mail address of, and individual
point of contact for, such electronic communication service provider or remote
computing service provider; and (B) make a report of such facts or circumstances
to the CyberTipline, or any successor to the CyberTipline operated by such
center.
18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1)(A)–(B).
87. § 2258A(e).
Summer 2012] VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR INTERNET PROVIDERS 125
C. Sui Generis Perspective
As a final aspect to this program, a sui generis perspective88
should be adopted because this material pertains specifically to illegal
child pornography. ISP vicarious liability should be addressed on its
own and not lumped into irrelevant case law such as Zeran. Behind
this perspective is the logical premise that regulation of child pornog-
raphy illustrates a unique concern for the well-being of minors and
their exploitation via the Internet.
Such a rationale, first and foremost, fosters a mindset where the
exceptions under § 230(e) are considered by courts as realistic op-
tions against granting carte blanche immunity to ISPs. In doing so,
this important exception will regain its teeth as a mechanism in pro-
tecting children in the context of child exploitation via the Internet.
Furthermore, a sui generis perspective will allow members of the
legal community, most notably judges, the opportunity to recognize
the differences between child exploitation cases and other irrelevant
case law. Most importantly, this will minimize courts’ reliance on
Zeran, which, as previously established, may illustrate a sound decision
but is not relevant in the context of cases involving child exploitation.
In taking this important step, courts can move toward examining cases
as pled in an effort to establish more relevant common law in this
context.
D. Policy Argument and Congressional Intent
Taken in the aggregate, the policy argument will also be in line
with the congressional intent behind § 230 of ensuring that the threat
of litigation would not hinder the development of the Internet.89 Ad-
ditionally, Congress hoped that creating such immunity would subse-
quently remove disincentives for self-regulation by ISPs.90
In addressing the threat of litigation, the proposed policy would
not only preclude an increase but would actually ensure a decrease in
litigation. Since ISPs enrolled in the program would hold a “seal of
approval” from the FCC, they would already be in compliance with
relevant regulations, at least in regard to websites they themselves
own. Therefore, it would be highly unlikely that such ISPs would be in
situations where their websites are acting as forums for hosting illegal
88. Sui generis literally means “of its own kind” and is used to describe something that
is unique or different. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 126 (9th ed. 2009).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2), (4) (2000).
90. See § 230(a).
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hard-core child pornography. As such, frivolous litigation would be
curbed, which would also conform to congressional intent.
In addition to the threat of litigation, Congress also reasoned
that, in the absence of § 230 immunity, there would be a disincentive
for ISPs to regulate themselves.91 The proposed policy argument pre-
cludes such a result and is consequently in line with the legislative
intent. In fact, the proposed argument is structured so that there is an
incentive for ISPs to regulate themselves.
E. Summary of Benefits
In sum, the program would manifest a number of benefits. First
and foremost, the proposed policy will allow ISP-owned websites to be
more closely regulated. Consequently, some of the content hosted on
these websites, namely content involving illegal, hard-core child por-
nography, will be virtually nonexistent in such forums. At the same
time, since the scope of this program is relatively narrow, the burden
on ISPs would be minute.
In addition, the policy will create incentives for parents to sub-
scribe to better-regulated ISPs; after all, parents will be more willing to
subscribe to ISPs that are safer, better regulated, and backed by the
FCC. An increase in subscription from such parents will carry with it
the added benefit of offsetting any financial burdens enrolled ISPs
may incur as a result of the self-regulation. Thus, there will be a mu-
tual benefit: parents and society will benefit from better-regulated ISP-
owned websites while the ISPs will likely receive an increase in busi-
ness as a result of the FCC “seal of approval.”
V. Addressing Potential Criticisms
Like any new policy argument, this proposal is likely to be met
with criticism. In preemptively addressing foreseeable criticisms, the
policy argument’s practicality becomes that much stronger. Potential
criticisms would likely concentrate on three categories: cost, technol-
ogy, and social implications.
A. Cost
Undoubtedly, the cost of regulating a high volume of content on
a website is high. The cost of merely regulating ISP-owned websites,
91. See § 230(b)(4).
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however, would not be nearly as daunting.92 In addressing this con-
cern, it is important to note that this policy argument proposes that
ISPs would only be regulating those websites that they own. Moreover,
immunity from FCC regulations, coupled with increased business
from an FCC “seal of approval,” will likely generate enough income
for ISPs to balance any outstanding costs. In sum, the policy argument
presents a viable solution that would likely not be financially detri-
mental to participating ISPs.
ISPs with deep pockets could present another problem in this
context, in that would-be child pornographers might “forum shop”
for jurisdictions in which affluent ISPs are headquartered in order to
avoid individual liability. While this criticism has already been waged
by other commentary it still recognizes that, despite this potential
shortcoming, vicarious liability still presents the most obvious option:
[F]rom a policy perspective, holding corporations vicariously liable
for the actions of private individuals seems inappropriate when it
will not have any significant impact on those who upload objection-
able content to the Internet. Individuals need only shop in a
favorable jurisdiction for ISPs with deep pockets. Unfortunately,
despite the inherent difficulties with regulating the Internet
through private corporations, it is the most likely course of
action.93
B. Technology
Another foreseeable criticism of the proposed policy argument
centers on technological shortcomings. Current technology has not
yet reached the level where it can be viably administered to regulate
the Internet: “ISPs are not yet equipped with the requisite technology
to avoid the violations over the Internet. This requires high-tech lan-
guage and image processing and surely the technology is so far not
that advanced to cope with the problem of embedding technological
measures in the servers of ISPs.”94
This argument, however, is based on the assumption that the reg-
ulation would be broad in scope and encompass all content hosted by
the ISP. Much like the cost-based criticism addressed above, the tech-
nological aspect of the proposal is viable, because it requires the ISP
only deal with a relatively narrow portion of ISP-hosted content: con-
92. See Anchayil & Mattamana, supra note 73, at 48 (asserting “[i]ntermediaries
seemed a viable option as they have the ability to regulate the content online at very mini-
mal costs”).
93. See Shipchandler, supra note 62, at 456.
94. See Ayyaz, supra note 61.
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tent owned by the ISP. When understood through this narrow scope,
the need for high-tech language and image processing becomes much
less necessary. Similar technological measures have already been insti-
tuted with positive results on a wider scale than that proposed by this
policy argument. Since 2004, British Telecom has used a system called
“Cleanfeed” that restricts access to child pornography sites from its 2.7
million Internet subscribers.95 The system filters specific domain
names or unique numeric addresses associated with the web server
hosting the site.96 The lists are then supplied and updated by an in-
dustry-monitoring group named the Internet Watch Foundation.97
Other measures have also been instituted including restricting under-
age users of mobile devices from accessing adult content, moderating
chat rooms and other interactive services in which children are likely
to participate, and generally making sure that child protection mecha-
nisms keep pace with technological advancements.98 While such pro-
posals create a risk of infringing freedom of expression, the risk is
outweighed by the dramatic effect such measures could have on pro-
tecting children.99
C. Social Aspects
A final potential criticism to consider is how society will view a
system where ISPs regulate the content they host and the impact this
would have on regulating the Internet as a whole. By granting an ISP
the responsibility of regulating websites where they host content,
there is a concern that the ISP will have too much power to regulate
95. See Beyond Borders, Inc., supra note 4.
96. Id. It is important to note that, to date, British Telecom has not made any plans to
expand the project beyond child pornography sites. There has also been a backlash from
sites that believe they were wrongfully blocked. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
The UK Home Office recommends that public interactive communication prov-
iders undertake a risk assessment of the potential their service has to harm chil-
dren. If there is a risk to children, then they should employ moderation, which
involves a person or technical filter being responsible for reviewing content
posted by users. Technical moderation attempts to filter words and phrases it has
been programmed to identify, and telephone and e-mail addresses. However, it
can be outwitted by the creative use of combinations of numbers, letters and
punctuation marks. Human moderation is more effective and can be employed in
a variety of ways; content can be reviewed before it becomes visible to other users,
after it becomes visible, a sample of content can be reviewed, or moderation can
take place only after a request for intervention is made.
Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id.
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content on the Internet.100 In a broad context, there is apprehension
that ISPs under the proposed program would have the power to regu-
late content on the Internet as they see fit.101 Such a result would be
in conflict with a major purpose of the Internet, which is to foster the
free flow of ideas.
To counter this argument, one need only examine the scope of
the proposed policy. ISPs that choose to participate in the program
will be vicariously liable for, and thus would regulate, only content on
websites they own. Since many ISP web-hosting services include rate
restrictions that limit traffic volume, they are typically more popular
for smaller personal sites with low amounts of traffic and not condu-
cive to businesses or forums that generate large amounts of traffic.102
Accordingly, the program’s overall negative effect on the free flow of
information over the Internet would be nominal. Such an infinitesi-
mal effect on the free flow of information is a small price to pay for a
measure that will prevent the dissemination of content that exploits
children.
VI. Real World Application: Doe v. Bates
In order to grasp how the proposed policy argument would relate
to real-world application, it will be examined in the context of Bates.
Had Yahoo! voluntarily enrolled in the proposed program, it would
have undertaken vicarious liability for the content shared, posted, or
transmitted on the websites that it owned. Since the scope of Yahoo!-
owned websites would be relatively narrow in relation to the scope of
the Internet as a whole, the cost of regulating such sites would not
have had a dramatic impact on the free flow of information over the
Internet. In return for assuming vicarious liability under the program,
Yahoo! would not only receive an FCC “seal of approval” that would
likely draw more parents to use it as an ISP, but it would also receive
immunity from certain FCC regulations that could be potentially
costly.103
Applying the program to the facts of the case, Yahoo! would have
been monitoring the “Candyman” e-group in a cost-efficient manner
and would have likely recognized the posting of illegal hard-core child
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Jennifer Kyrnin, Before You Choose a Web Hosting Service, ABOUT.COM, http://web
design.about.com/od/webhosting/bb/aabhosting.htm (last visited June 26, 2012).
103. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (Supp. II Vol. 2 2008) (outlining the scope of po-
tential fines for not adhering to current FCC regulations in this context).
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pornography on an e-group which it owned. A technological system
such as “Cleanfeed” would filter specific domain names or unique
numeric addresses associated with the web server hosting the site. As a
result, those seeking to exploit children over the Internet would be
unable to candidly post illicit content in mainstream forums. In turn,
people randomly surfing the Internet, including children, would be
less likely to stumble across such disturbing material. The success of
the program would be twofold: (1) it would take a step toward a bet-
ter-regulated Internet in the interest of children while also fostering
an atmosphere for friendly competition among ISPs; and (2) it would
help courts recognize the sui generis nature of child exploitation
cases so that new precedent could be adopted in place of Zeran. Such
a result would be in line with the congressional intent behind § 230
and would take a small step toward making the Internet safer for the
next generation.
Conclusion
The state of the law regarding ISP liability for hosting content
dealing with the sexual exploitation of children is unsatisfactory. Sec-
tion 230 of the CDA provides civil immunity for ISPs from state law
claims. In the context of hosting content that illegally exploits chil-
dren, ISPs have been granted immunity from virtually any content
they host.
Section 230 jurisprudence illustrates two important shortcom-
ings. First, it mistakenly relies on Zeran—a case that hinged on a fac-
tual analysis entirely different from cases involving sexual exploitation
of children. Rather than address this phenomenon, courts have used
Zeran as a precedent in granting § 230 immunity. Second, courts have
been unwilling to use § 230(e) as an exception in cases—such as those
involving child exploitation—where ISP immunity may be
inappropriate.
After analyzing a number of options for imposing liability on
ISPs, it becomes evident that only a policy argument advocating vicari-
ous liability is viable. Such a program would be voluntary in an at-
tempt to be conservative in its approach. The scope of the proposed
policy would only be applicable to circumstances where the ISP owns
the website on which the content is hosted. In doing so, the program
would bypass two common hurdles to typical vicarious liability propos-
als: the existence of an employer-servant relationship and the direct
benefit to the ISP.
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Moreover, the program would utilize FCC participation by grant-
ing immunity to participating ISPs from certain regulations and would
also give a “seal of approval” that would serve to increase business to
participants. In a broad context, a sui generis perspective should be
used to differentiate other cases from cases that involve the particu-
larly vile nature of child exploitation. Ultimately, this proposal is in
line with congressional intent as it would not hinder the wider devel-
opment of the Internet and would create incentives for ISPs to regu-
late themselves.
After dismissing a number of potential criticisms to the proposed
policy argument, it becomes evident that this proposal is a viable first
step toward remedying the current situation. Undoubtedly, the pro-
cess toward making the Internet significantly safer for the next gener-
ation will be arduous and time-consuming. This proposal is a first step
in the right direction. The hope is that, though policy arguments can-
not realistically prevent situations such as the one in Bates overnight,
this policy can provide a basis toward precluding similar results in the
future.
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